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Introduction 
 
The study of global health governance has developed rapidly over recent years. The case that health 
is closely linked to globalization has been successfully made, with authors pointing to spatial 
compression, increasing trade flows and new patterns of consumption amongst other things as 
contributing to health crises on a new level and scale.i In turn, a widespread perception has emerged 
that there is such a thing as ‘global health’ and that it is (and needs to be) globally ‘governed’. 
Scholars have increasingly begun to pay attention to the ways in which health problems are 
addressed by (and in some cases created by) global policies, processes and institutions. What they 
have found is a vibrant and innovative policy arena which has recently undergone huge changes. 
New institutions have been created and many existing ones, including bodies such as the G8 and the 
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World Bank, have added health to their agendas and carved out major new roles for themselves in 
global health governance. Novel forms of public-private partnership (such as GAVI and the Global 
Fund) have emerged, and a range of other non-state actors (from the Gates Foundation to NGOs) 
have been incorporated into the ‘system’ of global health governance. This reshaping of the 
governance architecture has coincided with an unprecedented ‘resource boom’ in global healthii and 
the emergence of health as a matter of ‘high politics’.iii These developments might have been 
expected to improve responses to global health problems. Yet it is widely accepted that the failure 
to generate adequate responses to manifest health needs, particularly the needs of the poor, 
persists.  
 
The existing literature has identified a range of factors which help explain this ‘failure’ of global 
health governance, but it has not to date generated a conceptually and theoretically-grounded 
understanding of the global public policy processes which perpetuate it. In this paper we set out a 
new framework for analyzing global health policy-making.  Our intention is to offer a guide which 
will allow scholars to trace back the links in the causal chain which result in the selection of some 
global health policies over others. In the first section we make the case that there is such a thing as 
‘global health policy’, however ad hoc and informal elements of it may be, and that the existing 
global health governance literature (in particular constructivist-influenced work on framing)iv can 
help shed valuable light on some parts of the global health policy-making process.  
 
We then move on in the second section to set out our framework for understanding the factors 
which determine the production of global health policy. This framework draws upon public policy 
scholarship, especially work by John L. Campbell, Peter A. Hall, Yves Surel and Paul A. Sabatier. We 
argue that global health policy is the product of various material and ideational drivers. Power is 
important, but so are ideas. In relation to ideas, we put forward a case that the way in which 
proposed policies are ‘framed’ is central to explaining how consensus is built around certain policy 
choices. Yet there is a need to understand why, and in what circumstances, particular frames are 
persuasive. In framing an issue in a particular way, an actor (or ‘policy entrepreneur’)v connects it 
with a set of deeper paradigms which form the ideational underpinnings of global health 
governance. These paradigms influence (often unconsciously) the ways in which actors think and talk 
about global health problems. In framing an issue actors are drawing on these deeper paradigms to 
identify a problem and propose a concrete policy solution. In response, we often find other actors 
engaged in a policy debate forwarding alternative framings, and a process of contestation ensues. 
 
However, the ‘playing field’ on which these policy debates are played out is not even. The power (or 
authority) of a policy entrepreneur clearly makes a difference. But as well as material power, policy 
debates in global health are also structured by deeply-embedded ideas dominant in the 
contemporary global political environment, in particular the powerful logic of neoliberalism. For us 
neoliberalism constitutes a ‘deep core’vi of the global polity because it operates across almost all 
areas of global governance, and ‘colonizes’ and influences all the major paradigms of global health. 
In section three we outline three ways in which neoliberalism structures debates and shrinks ‘policy 
space’ in global health policy, imposing constraints and limiting what is ‘sayable’, ‘doable’ - and even 
what is ‘thinkable’ - in global health governance.  
 
 
Global Health Policy and Global Health Policy-Making 
 
Before examining global health policy making, it is necessary to explain what we mean by the term 
‘global health policy’. Indeed, some may doubt that such a thing can exist within the diverse and 
often uncoordinated ‘architecture’ of global health governance, an architecture which many identify 
as one of the key shortcomings of the existing global health governance ‘system’.vii But, we argue 
here, a lack of coordination does not entail an absence of policy: global health policy-making is 
clearly occurring and is affecting health outcomes in every region of the world. 
 
Although it is seldom, if ever, defined, the term ‘global health policy’ (or sometimes ‘international 
health policy’) is regularly invoked in the literature, although in a variety of ways, often with little 
precision, and often in a manner synonymous with other concepts such as global health governance. 
One of the ways in which the term has most often been used is in relation to the transmission of 
health-related policies from International Organizations to national health systems. Schiller, Hensen 
and Kuhnle, for example, examine the policies which actors such as the WHO, UNICEF, the World 
Bank and the WTO are generating for national health systems.viii Thus, for them, global health policy 
is viewed primarily as being transmitted ‘downwards’, from the global to the national health policy-
making space. Others have viewed global health policy more widely, and have included ‘bottom-up’ 
responses within their definitions. Lee, Fustukian and Buse define it as 
 
the ways in which globalization may be impacting on health policy, and alternatively what 
health policies are needed to respond to the challenges raised by globalising processes.ix 
 
For them, global health policy-making occurs at a variety of levels: local, national regional and  
international. We see global health policy as being both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’. National 
governments are being forced to respond to global health problems. At the same time there are 
examples of policies and regimes which are global in their origin and in their effects. Our definition 
also encompasses both formal instruments (such as laws, rules, standards, regulatory frameworks) 
and more informal outputs (such as principles, norms and guidance). Our understanding of global 
health policy is therefore a maximalist one, incorporating a range of actions and outputs that can be 
divided between formal and informal, and between ‘global-level policies for health’ and ‘policies for 
global health’, including such things as: 
 
 Formal national policies addressing global health problems (e.g. PEPFAR – a national policy 
instrument addressing the global HIV/AIDS pandemic). 
 Formal international laws, rules and standards either directly addressing global health issues 
(e.g. the International Health Regulations), or indirectly impacting upon global health (e.g. 
structural adjustment). 
 Informal national principles and norms addressing global health (often these are culturally-
specific, an example being the US culture of large-scale philanthropism which has had huge 
effects on contemporary global health governance). 
 Informal international principles and norms (e.g. the expectation that wealthy countries 
provide development assistance for health to poorer countries). 
 
Obviously, the more formal elements of global health policy are more easily detectable, but that is 
not to suggest that less formal principles and norms are any less significant. And whilst ‘global health 
policy’ definitely exists, we would not go so far as to say that there is any single agreed set of such 
policies.  For example, there is no single global policy for malaria. What exists is a range of 
overlapping and sometimes competing policies from various sources. 
 
 Global Health Policy Cycles: Insights from the Existing Literature 
 
However, our interest here is not only in the policy outputs themselves but also in how they come 
about.  Within the public policy literature the concept of the ‘policy cycle’ has been highly 
influential.x The policy cycle is typically presented as a four-stage heuristic model which follows the 
process from problem definition and agenda setting, through formal decision-making, to 
implementation and finally monitoring and evaluation.xi Whilst the policy cycle has been the subject 
of various critiques,xii it nevertheless provides a useful basis for analyzing the policy process. Our 
primary interest here is in the first two stages of the cycle (agenda setting and decision-making), 
although the model could be extended to apply to any or all of the stages. 
 
More recently the ‘domestic’ policy cycle framework has been ‘conceptually stretched’ to cover 
‘global public policy’ processes.xiii In contrast to the more clearly definable and spatially constrained 
domestic policy space, global public policy processes are much more messy. Stone has sought to 
encapsulate this multi-level and dynamic policy space via the metaphor of the ‘global agora’ which 
she describes as a “growing global public space of fluid, dynamic and intermeshed relations of 
politics, markets, culture and society.” What is characteristic of the global agora is that it is a 
“domain of relative disorder and uncertainty where institutions are underdeveloped and political 
authority unclear, and dispersed through multiplying institutions and networks.”xiv These features of 
the global agora are immediately evident in global health governance, where individual institutions 
(e.g. the World Health Assembly) may have clear mandates and procedures with regard to health 
policy-making but there is no settled hierarchy between the myriad institutions and agents. In fact, 
one of the defining features of global health governance is the sheer diversity of actors with the 
ability to produce policy, including: national governments; formal International Organizations (from 
the WHO to the World Bank); public-private partnerships; civil society organisations and epistemic 
communities; the private sector; and “global policy networks” encompassing some or all of these 
actors.xv  
 
Given the importance of global health policy, it is perhaps surprising that the global health 
governance literature has not to date produced a coherent framework for analysing its production. 
What the literature does provide, however, is an excellent basis for beginning to build such a 
framework. Indeed the global health governance literature has become increasingly sophisticated 
and nuanced over time and, drawing on a range of theoretical approaches. Variously, it has 
catalogued the substantial recent changes global health governance has undergone, attempted to 
describe the bewildering complexity of the existing ‘system’, and made a powerful case that the 
global health governance is ‘failing to deliver’. Whilst clearly no single explanation for this failure 
suffices, scholars have supplied a persuasive list of economic and political factors which militate 
against effective global health governance. These include resource scarcity, which both exacerbates 
health problems and undermines governance responses;xvi the failure to properly utilise those 
resources which are available;xvii a lack of coordination between different global health actors and a 
‘confusion of mandates’;xviii the ‘vertical’ orientation of many global health programmes and policy 
initiatives which can create  “islands of excellence in seas of under provision”;xix market failure;xx and 
the simple absence of political will.xxi Whilst we agree with the broad thrust of these diagnoses, what 
the literature has not generally done is to interrogate the reasons why these failures continue to be 
reproduced through an examination of policy processes, and it is in this area that this paper seeks to 
make a contribution. The literature frequently tends to jump from describing the institutional 
architecture to the ‘end product’ of a policy process without really addressing what structures and 
determines the policy process. 
 There have been two notable exceptions to this, both of which have offered real value in informing 
our framework. The first include a number of detailed studies which have been carried out on the 
creation of particular policies or regimes, for example the negotiation of the revised International 
Health Regulationsxxii and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.xxiii The second are 
constructivist -inspired attempts to understand the process through which certain health issues 
come to be prioritised whilst others are not (for example the work of Shiffmanxxiv and Shiffman and 
Smithxxv on agenda setting in global health). The ‘agenda-setting phase’ is crucial to the formation 
global health policy, and indeed is the first stage of the traditional ‘policy cycle’. Whilst Shiffman and 
Smith’s work has focussed largely on this initial phase, a number of the features which they have 
identified as important in explaining prioritization are similarly central to understanding other stages 
of the policy process. Labonté and Gagnon have used a similar conception of competing frames to 
analyze the ways in which states construct health as a foreign policy issue.xxvi In particular, they 
analyze the ways in health has been framed in terms of security, development global public goods, 
trade, human rights and ethical/moral considerations in national policy debates.  
 
 
 
A Framework for Analyzing Global Health Policy-Making 
 
Given the complexity of global health governance, there are certain constraints on any attempt to 
develop a single framework to guide the analysis of global health policy. The framework itself must 
be sufficiently flexible as to be applicable across different institutional settings, health issue areas, 
and different spaces and times of governance. The necessary generality of this framework is, of 
course, a potential weakness. Our aim, however, is to provide an indication of the questions which 
should be asked in analyzing global health policy-making rather than a rigid formulaic analytical 
guide.  
 
Our framework focuses on a number of explanatory levels and lines of force. At the most immediate 
level, framing plays a crucial part in debates over global health policies. The ways in which particular 
problems and solutions are framed by actors engaged in policy debates is one of the key means of 
apprehending why certain policy choices are made over others. Our model, however, takes framing 
only as a first step and looks behind these surface debates to link those frames to deeper ideational 
paradigms and to the distribution of power in the international system. Debates over appropriate 
responses are characterized by competition between actors advancing alternative frames and, in 
doing so, they are attempting to connect a proposed response to established paradigms which lie in 
the background of global health discourse. Whilst (like much of the constructivist literature) we 
highlight the ideational factors which contribute to the selection of global health policies, we also 
see various forms of power as playing an important role in the process.  
 
At an even deeper level, we argue that global health policy-making is structured by the logic of 
neoliberalism. We view neoliberalism as the ‘deep core’ of the contemporary global political 
economy,xxvii representing a set of shared beliefs that structures many areas of global public policy. 
This is not to say that neoliberalism is uncontroversial, nor to dismiss the importance of counter-
hegemonic discourses, nor to ignore the fact that there are cases in which global public policy runs 
contrary to its logic. In general, however, neoliberalism profoundly affects the configuration of 
power and authority in global health governance, embodies a range of policy preferences which can 
be applied directly to health, and combines in powerful ways with the dominant paradigms of global 
health. Thus in our model we see neoliberalism as playing an overarching role, setting “constraints 
on the range of solutions which actors perceive and deem useful for solving problems”.xxviii  
 
Here we present our model in diagrammatic form and the article then sets out the key issues at each 
level, beginning with framing and the construction of global health policy and then moving on to 
‘trace back’ the deeper influences on the policy process.  
 
  
Figure 1: Framework for analysing global health policy-making 
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Frames and Paradigms 
 
Policy debates are characterized by contestation between competing framings of global health 
issues. Frames draw – either implicitly or explicitly - on broad ideational paradigms of health. The 
success or failure of an attempted framing is a consequence of both the extent to which the frame 
‘resonates’ with these broader paradigms, and also the ‘power’ of the framer.   
 
Frames 
 
Frames are linguistic, cognitive and symbolic devices used to identify, label, describe and interpret 
problems and to suggest particular ways of responding to them.xxix Global health governance actors 
deliberately (and in many cases strategically) forward particular frames “to help fix meanings, 
organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and 
propose solutions to ongoing problems.”xxx When they are successful in doing so, the chosen frame 
“resonates with public understandings [here, with deeper paradigms] and are adopted as new ways 
of talking about and understanding issues.”xxxi Framing influenza as an international security threat, 
to take one example, clearly identifies it as a certain type of global problem which requires particular 
forms of global response. As a result, frames fundamentally affect the ways in which global health 
policy is crafted and lead to one policy outcome being selected over others. 
 
There are a number of elements of framing which are directly relevant for the model which we put 
forward here and which have clear links with various phases in the policy cycle. The first is ‘issue 
construction’ which can determine whether or not an issue makes it onto the global health 
governance agenda at all. Like Shiffman, we see ideas as playing an important role in this process, 
and in doing so join him in rejecting a positivist account in which “a condition or risk is a problem 
when it becomes serious; a problem becomes a priority if it grows in scope and gravity”, in favour of 
a constructivist one in which, “there may be disagreement over what qualifies as a problem” and 
framing plays an important part in persuading an audience to prioritize a particular issue.xxxii  
 
Actors also use framing techniques in the next stage of the policy cycle (in which formal policy 
decisions are made) to demonstrate that their proposed policy response is the right one. Policy 
entrepreneurs can have various motives for selecting particular frames. Often they will frame health 
issues and their proposed responses in order to build consensus around what they genuinely believe 
to be the best solution.xxxiii Contestation in such cases is indicative of deep-rooted differences in the 
ways in which actors see, interpret and respond to the world around them. However, framing can 
also be used instrumentally by actors in an attempt to justify (or even to mask the true motives for) 
prior policy choices. This manipulation of frames – often called ‘frame distortion’ – is well-recognised 
in the literature,xxxiv and can make it difficult to determine the sincerity of a given instance of 
framing.  
 
Whatever their motive, actors engaged in framing at any stage of the policy cycle are pursuing a 
strategy of persuasion, aiming to use the strength of a particular frame to influence other actors’ 
perceptions of their own interests and convince them of the legitimacy/appropriateness of the 
framer’s preferred policy response. The likelihood of a particular frame successfully persuading an 
audience rests upon a number of variables.xxxv As we discuss below, the identity of the policy 
entrepreneur matters: powerful actors are more likely to be successful in persuading an audience. 
Yet power does not offer a full explanation. The likelihood of successfully persuading other actors 
also depends to a large extent on the degree to which the chosen frame resonates with shared 
commitments to the deeper paradigms which preoccupy the next section of this paper, and as to the 
perceived applicability of that paradigm to the issue in hand. It is certainly not the case that any 
issue could be successfully framed in any way – the empirical facts and inherent characteristics of a 
health problem place certain limits on what frames could credibly be deployed. Nevertheless, 
successfully applying a new frame to an old problem can have a dramatic impact on the global 
response. 
 
Which frame(s) come to dominate the global governance of a particular issue is not a given. 
Frequently there will be contestation between different frames, with different actors promoting 
their own ways of understanding (and in turn their own preferred ways of addressing) a particular 
issue. Most global health issues can be framed in more than one way, and consensus is not always 
achieved. At any one time, different governance agents may be pursuing divergent policy 
approaches in relation to the same global health issue, a problem which is only partly captured by 
the global health governance literature’s identification of a lack of coordination in the system. 
Nevertheless, there are often policy trends evident which are the product of the ascendancy of a 
particular frame. The growing prevalence of the concept of ‘Global Health Security’ in the policy 
discourse, for example, is a product of the framing of particular health problems (mainly infectious 
disease pathogens) as security threats.xxxvi 
 
Paradigms 
 
For public policy scholars such as Peter A. Hall, John L. Campbell and Fred Block, paradigms lie in the 
‘cognitive background’ of policy processes. Paradigms are “[u]nderlying theoretical and ontological 
assumptions about how the world works” and “[p]aradigmatic effects are profound because they 
define the terrain of policy discourse”.xxxvii Thus paradigms structure how actors view and 
understand the world, embody taken for granted ideas and assumptions about how the world 
works, and as a consequence “limit the range of alternatives policy makers are likely to perceive as 
useful”.xxxviii Other scholars have used alternative terminologies (such as Sabatier’s ‘policy core’xxxix) 
to denote much the same thing.xl When proposed policy choices are framed in a way which fits (or 
resonates) with these paradigms, “they appear natural and familiar and, as a result, are more likely 
to appeal to policymakers than alternatives that do not.xli 
 
Frames and paradigms are therefore closely linked. Whilst frames lie in the ‘cognitive foreground’ of 
policy processes, paradigms lie in the ‘cognitive background’.xlii  In framing an issue, actors are 
putting forward a particular interpretation of one or more paradigms, thus automatically limiting the 
terrain of the policy discourse and, likewise, inferring particular types of policy response (which 
Campbell calls ‘programmatic ideas’).xliii  
 
Given the centrality of health to human and social life, the range of interests at stake, and health’s 
cross-cutting policy dimensions, it is no surprise that there are a number of powerful paradigms in 
the ‘cognitive background’ of global health. These paradigms are often historically and structurally 
embedded and widely diffused. They embody various cognitive assumptions about the nature of 
‘health’, the roles of governance actors, and about the broader social world. Within contemporary 
global health there are a huge range of powerful paradigms, each of which embodies particular 
assumptions, norms, values and understandings. Whilst it is impossible to devise a comprehensive 
list of such paradigms (or to formulate universally-agreed labels to describe them), there are a 
number which are particularly influential in global health policy-making. Here we offer four: 
 Biomedicine is drawn from the Western medical tradition but has in many ways become the globally 
dominant paradigm, at least amongst medical professionals (although even here other streams of 
thought, such as social medicine, are evident). It focuses on understanding the structure and 
mechanisms of the human body and diseases. Biomedicine revolves around positivistic scientific 
research and prevention and intervention at the level of the individual patient, for example through 
the development and use of pharmaceuticals. Biomedicine is often presented as being a value-
neutral techno-scientific knowledge system and thus as not ‘normative’ in any real sense. 
 
Human Rights is another well-established paradigm which has, over recent decades,  become 
important in global health through the assertion of a ‘human right to health’ by a variety of actors, 
including the WHO and various civil society organizations. Its normative stance towards health is 
based on the universality of individual and/or community rights, and the consequential obligations 
on others to protect those rights. In practice, however, there are often tensions between the human 
right to health and other rights, particularly notions of individual liberty and the right of individuals 
to make choices about their own body. 
 
Security has been described as an ‘essentially contested’ concept,xliv but despite this its various forms 
all rest cognitively on a threat-defence logic.xlv In global health terms, this has most commonly been 
applied to addressing the threats posed by the trans-border spread of infectious diseases. In more 
recent years the security paradigm has changed as the range of referent objects have been 
broadened, opening the way for a range of new securities, from ‘human security’ to ‘global health 
security’. Part of the normative power of security is its concentration on existential threats, tying it 
closely to the ultimate health issue: life and death. 
 The economic paradigm rests on a set of assumptions, the most powerful of which is that health, like 
any other commodity, is a scarce resource.xlvi Whilst supply is always limited by available resources, 
the demand for health is inelastic (people’s demand for a life-saving treatment does not decrease 
with price). The dominant contemporary normative position is that the market is the most efficient 
(or indeed the only) means of balancing the supply-demand equation. 
 
This paper could proceed with a similar rehearsal of other influential paradigms in global health 
policy, including international development, moral/religious (or ‘civilizational’) views, and 
communitarian ideas, but the point is clear. We simply seek here to indicate the nature and range of 
paradigms that appear most commonly (and ‘fit naturally’) in the global health discourse. These 
paradigms as presented here are heuristic devices for looking at the ideational underpinnings of 
global health governance. In reality these paradigms are themselves internally contested, overlap, 
and change over time. The hierarchy between them is also subject to change. Although the public 
policy literature that has examined ‘paradigm shifts’ has generally examined cases of one paradigm 
giving way to another.xlvii In global health there is almost never only one paradigm at work. Finally, it 
is of course the case that many international actors would subscribe to many or all of these 
paradigms, at least in the abstract. At the level of particular responses to particular problems, 
however, they often come into conflict. 
 
Relationship between frames and paradigms 
 
In our framework, framing provides the linkage between paradigms which reside in the 
cognitive background of global health and the foreground of policy debates. In framing an 
issue, actors are (either consciously or unconsciously) labelling it in a way which connects it 
with these ‘cognitive background’ ideas which, given their broad nature, do not offer precise, 
uncontroversial or operable principles which could guide a governance response. 
 
Frames are thus inextricably linked to paradigms, but paradigms themselves are so broad that they 
do not directly infer particular policy outcomes:  actors can frame an issue in relation to the same 
paradigm but in support of very different – even opposite - policy preferences. The case of tobacco 
control provides a classic example of this. Anti-tobacco campaigners have often suggested framing 
the implications of (passive) smoking as a human rights issue.xlviii Their success in doing so can be 
seen in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which, in its preamble, refers to a whole 
series of rights, including “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health.”xlix Yet the opposing arguments have also been framed in relation to 
the human rights paradigm. The tobacco industry has often couched its arguments in terms of 
individual rights, arguing for the existence of a right to smoke (as freedom of choice) and portraying 
tobacco control policies as discriminatory.l  
 
It is clear from this discussion that we see ideas as having a key part to play in the policy cycle. In 
terms of operationalizing this framework, there are a number of questions which could be applied to 
any policy cycle, including: 
 
 What language is used in discussions of a global health issue (i.e. how is it framed)? 
 What competing frames are brought to bear? How well do they resonate with the major 
paradigms of global health? 
 Who voices particular framings and within what institutional contexts (e.g. particular 
communities of experts, organisations, the media)? 
 What authorities, texts etc are cited in support of a particular framing? 
 How do the audience react to particular framings (do they gain support or are they 
opposed? Are they repeated in other contexts? etc)? 
 Are ideational links drawn between different policy fields/issue areas (e.g. are examples of 
successes/failures in other areas deployed)? 
 How do framings differ at different stages of the policy cycle: are they consistent or do they 
change? 
 
 
Power and Authority 
 
Ultimately, framing is a question of agency, and in global governance this inevitably brings in power 
relations. Although, as mentioned above, the extent to which a frame resonates is an important 
variable in the success or failure of framing, clearly the process of contestation between competing 
frames is profoundly affected by power. Global health governance is not a Habermasian ‘ideal 
speech’ situation in which the best argument wins out. Power matters, and outcomes are 
determined not only by the persuasiveness of a particular frame, but also by who is advancing that 
frame. This would not be news to most constructivist scholars: it is well-recognised that powerful 
actors use frames strategically in order to advance (or secure) their interests.li Yet work on 
argumentation in international politics points to the fact that sometimes the better argument does 
win out, even when forwarded by (materially) non-powerful actors (whether that be small states or 
non-state actors).lii It is possible for less powerful actors to successfully advance particular framings 
of an issue and to persuade other actors to adopt that frame.  
 
Even so, we would not want to argue that material power does not play a central role in the 
production of global health policy: it clearly does. In the most extreme cases, material power (and 
even coercion), exercised either publicly or behind the scenes, can determine policy outcomes. The 
TRIPS agreement, for example, was included in the WTO Uruguay Round largely at the insistence of 
the US, whose framework for the eventual agreement was itself developed by US Pharma and other 
knowledge-producing corporations.liii It was foisted on developing countries by a process of ‘trade 
weight’ and carrot-and-stick measures, in a sense the exercise of ‘hard power’. In practice, however, 
even materially powerful actors usually see it as necessary to frame their proposed governance 
responses in such a way as to be broadly acceptable to other, and it is rare for coercion alone to 
explain outcomes in global health governance. Rather, the process of contestation is characterised 
by a combination of relational power and the persuasiveness of the ideas themselves.  
 
There are also different kinds of power to consider. Material power (in the form of economic 
resources, for example) is not the only kind of power that matters in global health governance. We 
can posit a number of other forms of power (‘authority’ might be a better word) which enable 
certain actors to be unusually effective in forwarding their chosen framings of global health issues.  
 
One example is the various forms of authority which accrue to actors in certain influential positions. 
The bureaucracies of International Organizations which, as Barnett and Finnemore have argued, are 
able to “use discursive and institutional resources to induce others to defer to their judgement”, are 
one example.liv This authority is partly a product of expertise, but also rests upon their roles in 
classifying the world, fixing meanings, diffusing norms, and creating and following institutional rules 
and procedures. It should not be a surprise that the institutional cultures of IOs impact profoundly 
upon the kinds of governance response which they are likely to pursue, and the types of frames they 
deploy.  Epistemic communities are influential in global health, and also find themselves in a 
privileged position to advance particular framings within certain institutional settings. The global 
biomedical community, for example, wields enormous ‘soft power’ in terms of its ability to 
persuade, argue for, and justify particular approaches and solutions. Cortell and Peterson have 
identified an influential institutional culture of biomedicalism at the WHO,lv and framings of health 
policies in biomedical terms have an enormously powerful appeal both to other policy communities 
and the general public. The appeal to expertise, scientific method and neutrality all confer upon it 
the power to influence other governance actors.  
 
Power of various forms can also influence the extent to which actors are able to engage in a policy 
process in the first place, and beyond this can confer a special status or legitimacy upon certain 
actors. This type of power, then, is essentially a product of an actor’s position within the structures 
of global health governance (although that in itself cannot be divorced from other forms of power).  
 
Power, frames and policy context 
 
A combination of power and ideas determines the institutional contexts within which policy cycles 
take place, and the different mix of actors involved. Ideas legitimize the use (or creation) of certain 
institutions, and thus are constitutive of the very architecture of global health governance. It was 
through a particular set of ideas about health and economic development, for example, that the 
World Bank gradually became an important institution in global health. The phenomenon of ‘regime 
shifting’, “whereby states and nonstate actors relocate rulemaking processes to international venues 
whose mandates and priorities favor their concerns and interests” has also been apparent.lvi Helfer, 
for example, has described the way in which the United States and the European Community 
deliberately shifted negotiations over the intellectual property regime from WIPO to the WTO, and 
have continued to deploy this strategy with regard to global IPRs.lvii Framing can also be used 
deliberately by less materially powerful actors in order to draw new institutions and actors into the 
debate.  
 
Given the complex mix of power and ideas at work in global health governance, there is a clear 
methodological problem in demonstrating the claim that frames and paradigms (rather than 
material power) are really doing the work in shaping the nature of global health responses. Providing 
evidence of this causality is a difficult process, and one for which there is no perfect solution. This is 
not a problem confined to the framework presented here, but rather one which is characteristic of 
the broader constructivist project. Shiffman, for example, provides a list of 11 factors which shape 
prioritisation, including factors related to both actor power and ideas, but faces the same problem 
as us in weighing the relative importance of those factors. Perhaps the heart of the problem is that 
general frameworks only take on meaning when applied to specific issues (in our case to specific 
policy cycles). There is no standard weighting between power and ideas: the factors play out 
differently in different cases. 
 
We can, however, suggest methodological strategies which have been put forward in the literature 
which we believe can help us to show the policy impact of particular ways of framing a given global 
health issue, and help us to identify whether frames or power are really doing the explanatory work. 
Of course, we would not argue that researchers are value-neutral or able to operate outside of these 
debates. Nevertheless, Campbell outlines a number of promising approaches which all involve 
careful tracing of policy processes.lviii Interviewing policy-makers in order to map their policy 
preferences and also their interpretation of particular policy-relevant events is one method. Detailed 
historical tracing of policy processes – including analyzing policy documents and other texts – can 
also help to link particular framings of issues with a governance response. Others have suggested 
more formal methodological approaches, including a variety of quantitative and qualitative coding 
procedures used to identify frame-relevant patterns in the documentary evidence.lix Our contention 
is that it is through a mixture of such methods, applied in a careful and detailed way to individual 
policy cycles, the causal links between ideas and governance responses can be shown. Similar 
methodologies can be used to identify the operation of power in policy processes, and again much 
rests on the facts of the individual case. Deployment of resources (as is increasingly the case with 
the Gates Foundation’s funding of global health programmes) brings both a seat at the table of 
global health governance and the ability to directly affect policy outcomes. Institutional 
representation (e.g. board membership) is also an indicator or instrumental power. Thus mapping 
the actors and resource flows in a policy field can tell us much about the effects (and the 
distribution) of power.  
 
In the light of this discussion we can add to the questions which we identified above. 
 
 What actors, communities and institutions have a visible stake in the outcomes a policy 
process? 
 Who is involved in determining policy outcomes? Which institutions/individuals provide 
leadership, and who is excluded from the policy process?  
 Is the policy process/outcome seen as legitimate or not? 
 What communities of experts are referenced and deployed in policy debates? 
 Who provides the resources to implement policy and what conditionalities are attached, if 
any? 
 Is contestation apparent in the policy cycle, and how is such contestation mediated or 
settled? 
 In what ways is procedural power evident (e.g. through standard operating procedures, 
policy templates, institutional structures and hierarchies etc)? 
 Is there evidence that actors without traditional material power have influence on policy 
outcomes? 
 
 
The ‘Deep Core’ of Neoliberalism 
 
Part of the problem with many of the constructivist approaches to global health governance (and 
indeed to global governance more broadly) is the over-emphasis on agency and ideas to the neglect 
of deeper structural determinants. The ‘playing field’ on which global policy debates are played out 
is not level, but is skewed by historically specific and deeply embedded ideas and configurations of 
power. Constructivists, of course, would argue that agents and structure are mutually constituted.lx 
Equally, neo-Gramscians would see nothing particularly radical in viewing particular ‘world orders’ as 
the product of a dialectical relationship between power, politics, economics (and production) and 
ideas.lxi For our purposes this agent-structure debate can be bracketed off. What matters for our 
framework is not how or why the ‘deep core’ of neoliberalism came to be dominant, but that it is, 
and that it impacts on global policy processes in a number of ways.  
 
The public policy literature has employed various terminologies to denote what we call here the 
‘deep core’. Whatever terminology is chosen, the point is that:  
 
“At the highest/broadest level, the deep core of the shared belief system includes basic 
ontological and normative beliefs ... which operate across virtually all policy domains.”lxii  
 
The deep core provides an overarching logic and a background set of assumptions and values that 
has influence across policy areas and social spaces. As such we would expect the deep core to 
operate across institutions and policy areas, from global economic governance to global 
environmental governance, and to permeate down through societies, from the global to the level of 
the self-regulation of individuals. Thus, whilst the paradigms of global health which we identified 
above operate across global health governance, the deep core operates across many, if not all, areas 
of global governance. Clearly, the deep core is always historically specific and is intertwined in a 
reciprocal relationship with other structurally-embedded ‘ways of doing things’ (such as 
transnational finance and production), forms of social organization, political subjectivities, and 
gender relations. 
 
Neoliberalism has been seen to be operating in this way in a variety of policy fields,lxiii and we see 
this as holding true in global health. Clearly neoliberalism has not always occupied this position – 
indeed the neoliberal economic model has only come to replace Keynesianism over the last 30 years 
or so.lxiv Neither is the neoliberal ideology uncontroversially accepted by all actors in the 
international system. We view the position of neoliberalism with regard to our paradigms and 
framings of global health policy in a similar fashion to Cerny’s articulation of a globally ‘hegemonic 
paradigm’. Cerny makes a case for viewing neoliberalism as a broader, deeper and more dominant 
force in global life than is more circumscribed antecedent that characterised a critical phase in 
national economic policy making in the 1980s: 
 
Neoliberalism has increasingly come to frame intellectual and political debates in recent 
years as economic doctrine, public policy agenda, descriptive framework, analytical 
paradigm and social discourse. It has become deeply embedded in 21st century institutional 
behavior, political processes and understandings of socio economic “realities.” In this way it 
has superseded “embedded liberalism”… as the common sense and key “shared mental 
model”… of the evolving “art of governmentality” in a globalizing world…. Embedded 
neoliberalism has become the common sense of the 21st century.lxv  
 
Following this broadened understanding of neoliberalism, we see three particular ways in which it 
has evolved to shape global health policy; 
 
First, neoliberalism has affected the configuration of power and authority through the rolling back of 
state (and international public) authority over health, whilst also diffusing authority across a wider 
range of both public and private actors.lxvi Thomas and Weber have shown how the transition from a 
broadly social democratic system to one defined by neoliberalism has affected the institutional 
configuration of global health governance.lxvii In particular, they argue that global financial 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO took on a pre-eminent role after this change, 
usurping the agencies of the United Nations System, and bringing with them a very different set of 
policy preferences. Similarly, Rick Rowden has shown how neoliberalism has provided the ideological 
blueprint for the IMF’s role in GHG, a role which, according to Rowden, has entailed the systematic 
undermining of many public health systems.lxviii The increasing importance of the private sector as 
‘partners’ in global health governance has also been widely noted, as has the appeal to markets as 
the most efficient mechanism for allocating scarce health resources. By a gradual ceding of authority 
to institutions who promote neoliberalism in health, neoliberalism’s dominance has become 
concretized and self-fulfilling. 
 
The second way in which neoliberalism structures global health governance is by embodying a series 
of policy preferences (many of which have been applied in other areas of global governance) that 
are now being widely applied to global health issues. These preferences explain some of the 
contemporary ‘policy trends’. The most commonly noted of these is the promotion of liberalized and 
privatized healthcare systems, a trend which is having significant global effects on the ability of 
people to access health services. Furthermore, the same trends in other areas of public service 
provision also have important health implications. The privatization of water and sanitation services, 
for example, has often been made a precondition for World Bank and IMF loans, and has clear 
health consequences if it excludes some people from access to clean water.lxix These policy trends 
are often manifest in the approaches taken by powerful global health governance actors, most 
notably the international financial institutions, who have developed a range of policy templates 
which they apply to countries through the use of various mechanisms such as World Bank Country 
Health Portfolios and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.lxx  
 
Third, neoliberalism colonizes many of the paradigms of global health which we highlighted above. 
To take one example, biomedicine and neoliberalism have made natural bedfellows, sharing as they 
do an emphasis on individuals as being autonomous and rational consumers ultimately responsible 
for their own risk behaviours and their own well-being. Colleen O’Manique has argued in the case of 
HIV/AIDS that: 
 Intrinsic to both neoliberalism and biomedicine is an individualistic view of humans, a view 
that is reflected in the policy response to AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. The largely biomedical 
policy response fits nicely into the neoliberal agenda, to the extent that factors that fuel the 
spread of HIV are not considered proper targets for intervention.lxxi 
 
Neoliberalism and biomedicine also come together in what has been termed ‘biopower’, wherein 
risk, behaviour (including sexual behaviour) and choice are individualized and made subject to 
governance (via measurement, monitoring etc). We witness this relationship, for example, in the 
growth of global markets for processed and fast food, whereby demand is often structured by 
aggressive marketing and franchising, where decisions about health risks are devolved to the 
consumer, and where regulation (health policy) is largely absent. At the same time, a range of 
governance actors are exploring ways of harnessing the market to modify individual behaviour. It is 
apparent in these moves that neoliberalism has deep-going effects vis a vis health governance, not 
least in the reconstitution of individuals and patients as rational economic actors (as is also present 
in QALY and DALY methodologies). In this way, not only are the macro-level economic, political and 
social determinants of health left to a great extent unaddressed, they are actually concealed. A 
similar colonization can be seen in relation to human rights and health.lxxii In short, the hegemony of 
the neoliberal orthodoxy results in a situation where all of the paradigms of global health exist and 
develop in a context defined by neoliberal ideas.  
 
In all of these ways neoliberalism has the effect of limiting what is sayable, doable and even 
thinkable in global health governance. The range of arguments which can be legitimately advanced 
are circumscribed, and beyond this neoliberalism’s embedded nature means that there is seldom 
any need for its ideological strictures to be enforced: the ‘orthodoxy’ is just that and is well on the 
way to having a ‘taken for granted’ quality which global governance actors rarely seek (or even 
think) to challenge. This does not, however, entirely exclude resistance. There remains the possibility 
of forwarding counter-hegemonic critical discourses and, as a result, there remains the possibility of 
change in global health governance.  
 
The deep core of neoliberalism, therefore, has both direct and indirect effects upon global public 
policy. It both privileges particular policy preferences and also structures the terrain on which policy 
debates take place. The challenge for the researcher, however, lies in identifying how the deep core 
permeates and manifests itself. We propose the following questions which aim to reveal its 
structuring power, focusing on the three lines of force detailed above (namely, the privileging of 
certain actors and voices; evidence of distinctive policy templates, and the manner in which it 
colonizes the paradigms of global health). Whist none of these questions in and of themselves 
provide conclusive proof of the role of neoliberalism, taken together they may provide persuasive 
evidence of its overarching structuring impact: Whilst this claim is clearly normative and the power 
and presence of neoliberalism continues to be a divisive and contentious referent in global political 
life, for us it is persistent and powerful enough to characterise the overarching meta-framework 
under which global health policy is at least presently conducted. 
 
Actors 
 What is the role of global economic actors and private interests in specific global health 
policy cycles? 
 Are particular states or groupings of states (e.g. G8) associated with particular policies, do 
they promote them, or mediate their facilitation? 
 How does their role relate to that of other global health governance actors? Are they 
dominant or just another voice? 
 How seriously are actors who critically engage with neoliberal policies taken? 
 
Policy Templates 
 What particular role is ascribed to states and other international public policy actors in the 
policy cycle? What roles are assigned to markets and private actors? 
 How are competing interests, for example between economic development and individual 
health status, balanced or reconciled? Does one set of objectives or interests predominate? 
 Have policy templates from other regimes or areas of policy been imported into global 
health policy, and are such templates associated with or indicative of neoliberalism? 
 To what extent are private actors and market mechanisms seen as legitimate or useful in 
securing policy outcomes? 
 
Paradigmatic effects 
 Are successful arguments framed in economic logics (e.g. efficiency, cost-saving) or do they 
employ economic evidence or methodologies? 
 Do certain policy debates/discourses include framings which combine paradigms of health 
with neoliberal ideas? 
 Are arguments put forward which bring together paradigms which may appear to be 
diametrically opposed (e.g. are policy debates ostensibly about development or public goods 
for health couched in discourses of market efficiency, consumer power and choice or the 
failure/inefficiency of public initiatives and interventions)? 
 Are policy debates characterised by framings which stress the individual nature of risk, 
responsibility and (un)healthy behaviour? 
 Are regulatory powers or policy interventions challenged on the basis that they infringe on 
private/individual/market rights? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued here that the determinants of global health policy are more profound and more 
deep-rooted than much of the current literature suggests. Here we have set out a framework for 
analysing global health policy cycles that attempts to capture the mixture of power, ideas, agency 
and structure, which informs each stage of the policy cycle and produces global health policy. We 
have set out a series of questions which, we believe, can help researchers to unpick these issues in 
relation to particular policy cycles. Much work remains to be done in tracing empirical examples of 
these processes. The contribution which this article is intended to make, however, goes beyond this. 
Through integrating insights from a range of literatures we have sought to enrich the conceptual 
basis of current work in the rapidly developing field of global health governance. In broader terms, 
the model could be of utility in any field of global public policy, and indeed there is scope for 
interesting comparisons to be made between global health and other sectors and regimes. 
 
Finally, in the light of the framework we set out here, we conclude with three deliberately normative 
contentions as to why global health governance is presently failing to adequately address manifest 
health needs. 
 Firstly, global health problems are often framed in unhelpful ways. This may be deliberate – actors 
seeking to justify certain policies in pursuit of an ulterior motive – or it may be the product of 
genuine beliefs. Either way, successfully framing a problem in a particular way determines the 
linguistic and cognitive terrain (and can therefore exclude other terrains), leading to consensus being 
built around the ‘wrong’ responses. This is obviously more likely to happen when the framer is a 
powerful actor, and it is for this reason that the framings put forward by powerful actors should be 
submitted to particular scrutiny. 
 
Secondly, the relationship between paradigms of health changes over time, and it may well be that 
in the contemporary system of global health governance the paradigms which dominate (we would 
identify in particular economics and biomedicine) militate against a broad social understanding of 
the determinants of health. Thus the cards are stacked against policy approaches which attempt to 
address these issues. 
 
Thirdly, and most fundamental for us, is the structuring logic of neoliberalism which exacerbates 
economic and health inequalities and limits the range of likely responses to global health problems. 
Many of the most innovative recent global health initiatives have been an attempt to smooth some 
of the rougher edges created by neoliberal global governance. They have not, however, 
fundamentally challenged it. So for now the crisis of global health seems likely to persist, and global 
health governance will likely continue to fail. 
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